to China's role and political position in the region. Ultimately, China's perceived inappropriate hard power measures affect its soft power, particularly in eroding the reputation of being a benign political entity as its source of soft power in Southeast Asia.
Introduction
The twenty first century has generally deemed to be an important era for China. Along with its remarkable transformation and modernization since 1978, China's political power in the international arena began to expand rapidly. The poor and weak China has become a center of attention in global politics (Brahm, 2001; Senkar, 2004 (Wong, 2010; Thayer, 2010, pp. 2-6; Jayakumar, 2011) . Along with existing conflicts over territorial claims between China and some Southeast Asian countries, the growing China's assertive measures eventually created a greater political concern in the region.
Indeed, there is a general tendency in privileging the preponderance of hard power calculations in the International Relations literatures (Baldwin, 1999, pp. 173-183) . This specifically exists in the scholarly literature on South China Sea conflicts (Green & Daniel, 2011; Karim & Tangguh, 2016) Afghanistan. However, it is important to note that US hard power measures as part of global 'war on terror' campaign, in fact, weaken its 'soft power' in the Middle East (Nye, 2004, pp. 42-44) . Reminiscing this context, a similar concern for China may arise, especially in light of the rising tension in the South China Sea conflicts. issue-specific forms of influence' (Hall, 2010, pp. 209 (Percival, 2007; Storey, 2013 
Conceptualizing Soft Power
The term 'soft power' is a unique notion. It becomes a distinct phrase as it refers to a large spectrum of non-military hard power in the international arena. It is also generally adopted in implying the various non-tangible modalities which support a particular state to persuade or influence the preferences of other states (Hall, 2010, pp. 190 (Hall, 2010, pp. 209 (Hall, 2010, pp. 207-211) .
Certainly, the examination of soft power needs to also acknowledge the intertwining mechanism between soft power and hard power. As Nye (2004, pp. 25-30; Li, 2009, pp. 4-5) (Li, 2009, pp. 5) . Moreover, it also indicates the subjective nature of international actors, especially the elite, as they perceive the growing external hard power measures (Tilman, 1984, pp. 2-3; Novotny, 2010, pp. 67-68).
The Nature of China's Soft Power in

Southeast Asia
Along with the onset of the post- forming the so-called 'China threat' theory (Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 396-402; Krauthammer, 1995, pp. 72; Roy, 1996, pp. 758-771 (Wang, 2011, pp. 37-53) . In this regard, China realized the need for overcoming the suspicion and mistrust from its regional environment and encountering the growing China threat theory with a careful projection of its soft power via promoting a better 'reputation' in the international arena (Deng, 2006, pp. 186-206 Asia (Nanto, 2008; Sutter, 2008, pp. 261-282) . In fact, this condition is also verified by how Southeast Asian eyes view China has transformed from 'the state most often feared into, for most but not all, a perceived partner' (Percival, 2007, pp. 3) .
Besides that, a public opinion survey in six Southeast Asian countries by the Japanese Foreign Ministry has indicated the rapid increase of China's influence in the region, even compared to that of Japan (Er, Narayanan, & Colin, 2010, pp. 44-66) .
At towards China rise (Kristof, 1998, pp. 37-49; Cho & Park, 2013 (Shirk, 2007, pp. 114) .
China believes that the other claimants have been taking advantage for a long time, especially in exerting its claim over and extracting resources from the South China Sea. This logic pushes Beijing to pursue a more active measures (Li, 2008 Asian countries, especially with regards to each country's economic dependency and security concern towards China ( Khong, 2004, pp. 192-197) . While some Southeast show a more cautious and circumspect manner, largely due to the concern in maintaining regional stability. However, (Hall, 2010, pp. 207-211) . In Phung Quang Thanh specifically cited that 'China has violated the DoC, raising concern in Vietnam and in the rest of the region' (IISS, 2011). Likewise, Filipino
Secretary of Defense Voltaire Gazmin also expressed his concern about Beijing's growing threat in his reference to another for instance, agreed to discuss the regional concern over the South Besides EAS, this particular concern was also affected ASEAN internal mechanisms. Despite not reaching a consensus, ASEAN Foreign Ministers'
Meeting in 2012 discussed the Philippines and Vietnam's concern about how Beijing was imposing 'its claim over the entire South China Sea and raising the risk of a conflict' (Thul & Grudgings, 2012 (Goh, 2007, pp. 823-824) . 
